Since a few people (namely Brett) wanted to read this:
Patronage Vs. Merit in Canadian Public Administration: An Analysis
Since the Civil Service Reform Act of 1918, Canadian public administration has been largely based on the concept of merit. That is, civil servants are hired based on their related job skills and their capacities to produce specific job-related results.[1] In spite of these reforms to the public service, patronage remains. Patronage is “the process by which governments award employment or contracts on the basis of partisan support rather than on merit.” [2] Thus, patronage is expansive enough to include not only appointments to civil service jobs and preference in government contracts, but also appointments to many other positions in the government. Therefore, patronage can also include appointments to the Senate, diplomatic posts, the judiciary and the offices of lieutenant governor in the provinces. With this expansive definition of patronage, it becomes evident that patronage remains a significant part of the Canadian government and Canadian public administration. It is important, however, to contrast the existence of patronage in a theoretically perfect model of the Canadian government with its existence in the actual government to understand how patronage takes place. Secondly, it is important to study the breadth of patronage opportunities available to illustrate how pervasive patronage is in our political system. For example, former Prime Minister Mulroney had appointed friends and party loyalists to patronage jobs at the rate of one every three hours during his first term.[3] Furthermore, the changing nature of patronage illustrates how patronage remains in the Canadian political system, despite the move to hiring based on merit for most civil service jobs. Lastly, the effects of patronage on the public service and on public opinion show whether patronage faces widespread disapproval or whether it has become an accepted part of the Canadian political system. Therefore, patronage remains in Canadian public administration because our political system is not perfect and affords many opportunities for patronage, because patronage has evolved to accommodate changing political dynamics, and because patronage has been persistent and may have become an accepted part of the Canadian political tradition. In a theoretically perfect model of Canadian public administration, politicians and thus, the government would hire and appoint individuals based solely on merit rather than on political friendships and connections. As such, there would substantially less patronage within Canadian public administration. For example, the Prime Minister has substantial appointment powers with respect to certain diplomatic positions in the Canadian Foreign Service. If appointments are based solely on merit, individuals should be appointed to positions as ambassadors and consul-generals because of their skills in diplomacy and knowledge of foreign languages and culture. That is, they should appoint people as Foreign Service officers based on their ability to produce results beneficial to
Canada in an international setting. However, in reality, Prime Ministers often appoint party members and friends to Foreign Service positions as rewards for faithful service. In the first fifteen months of the Mulroney government, nine Conservatives or friends of Mulroney received Foreign Service appointments.[4] Similarly, Jean Chrétien appointed Alfonso Gagliano as ambassador to
Denmark for purely partisan reasons related to the sponsorship scandal. However, such appointments are not limited to the diplomatic corps. Similarly, in a theoretically perfect model, the Prime Minister and Cabinet would select only qualified individuals to serve on the boards of Crown corporations or government agencies such as VIA Rail and the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation. However, beginning with the government of Pierre Trudeau, these managerial positions within the government multiplied and provided new avenues for the patronage that was no longer available in ordinary public service jobs.[5] Thus, in a perfect model of Canadian public administration, candidates are selected on the based on qualifications and merit. However, in present-day Canadian public administration, candidates are often selected for political and partisan reasons rather than for qualities relating to job performance.Similarly, in a perfect model of the Canadian government, if the government appointed or hired individuals on a purely partisan basis and if patronage is unpopular with the public, then it follows that governments that engage in patronage should find re-election more difficult. Historically, however, this has proven to be the case only some of the time. For example, in 1991,
Saskatchewan voters replaced the Tory government led by Grant Devine after charges of widespread corruption and diversion of public funds.[6] In contrast, Brian Mulroney and the Tories won a second majority government in 1988, despite the extensive patronage that occurred in their first term. Similarly, nearly all federal Canadian governments have appointed people to provincial and federal courts for partisan reasons that threaten judicial independence, without suffer repercussions from the electorate.[7] Thus, the actual form of Canadian public administration differs from its theoretical model for two main reasons. First, where the political system allows it, the Prime Minister and Cabinet often select individual for partisan reasons rather than the individuals most qualified for the jobs. Secondly, the public often tacitly condones patronage by refusing to punish parties that engage in it. However, when the public decries patronage and votes accordingly, the forms of patronage have changed subtly. This evolution of patronage illustrates how patronage persists in spite of the widespread move to merit selection in Canadian public administration. The types of patronage and methods of distributing it have changed substantially in
Canada since Confederation. Before the reforms to the public service instituted by Robert Borden in 1918, patronage primarily consisted of government jobs.[8] In fact, both Sir John A. MacDonald and Wilfrid Laurier believed that patronage was essential in building national political parties and national political integration.[9] However, the provision of government jobs to partisans and government supporters created frequent job turnover and an unprofessional public service. Demands by business leaders for a professional public service led to the reforms enacted by Robert Borden and created the first major change for patronage in
Canada. During the subsequent governments of Mackenzie King and Louis St. Laurent, patronage remained central to party management, albeit in a reduced form. This reduction, however, would not be a precursor to the decline of patronage. The growth of the social welfare state, particularly in the 1960’s and 1970’s, significantly increased the size of government and thus created more opportunities for patronage. The creation of Crown corporations such as Air
Canada and Petro-Canada, regulatory agencies such as the CRTC and the Atomic Energy Control Board, and the overall growth of government departments increased the availability of patronage positions.[10] The membership on the boards of Crown corporations and of government agencies were considered more political because they reflected a government’s style of management and thus, would be appropriate for partisan political appointments. Furthermore, the move towards a more client-centred approach of government under Trudeau spawned changes in public administration, under the guise of greater democratic participation and equality. These changes made it more acceptable for public servants to advocate for underprivileged groups, and, in some cases, even create government policy.[11] This trend created a perception, particularly among Conservatives, that unaccountable members of the public service were developing government policy and were acting in a political rather than a professional manner. The belief that some members of the public service were not politically neutral, along with the beliefs that government had become too large and that the social welfare state had failed, initiated the last major change within public administration and thus, the last major change in the allocation of patronage.Beginning in the 1980s, a major focus of government became improving efficiency within the public sector. It was thought that by adapting business practices from the private sector, the public sector could achieve improved efficiency, economy and effectiveness.[12] Similarly, since private sector management was believed to be superior to public administration, the government should test programs for alternative service deliveries (privatization, contracting out, private-public partnerships) and deregulate business wherever possible. These beliefs form the philosophy of the New Public Management (NPM)The ideas of the NPM, which aim to transform and reduce the public sector, merely altered and, in some cases, expanded patronage opportunities, rather than reduce them through reducing the size of the public sector. For example, governments often rationalize the use of public-private partnerships (P3s) in terms of cost savings and keeping project financing off government budgets. However, the government often retains the financing risk in such partnerships; an example of which is the Highway 407 Express Toll Route. Given the business-friendly nature of the provincial Conservative government of
Ontario at the time, providing an essentially risk-free venture to a large business consortium can be viewed as a type of patronage.[13] Contracting out by government also provides many similar opportunities for patronage. The federal government of
Canada contracts out legal work to lawyers known as “standing agents” throughout the country.[14] The selection of these lawyers by the Minister of Justice is based on recommendations by government MPs and other government party officials. Therefore, the appointments are invariably political and thus reflect a form of government patronage. Patronage involving government contracts, however, often is much broader than mere legal work, and often is distributed through government contracts with secret or no bidding. The federal government often tenders advertising contracts to advertising agencies that support the governing party. A recent example of this is the more than $250 million of advertising contracts given to Liberal Party-friendly advertising agencies between 1996 and1999. Similarly, the Syndicat des professionnels du Gouvrement du
Quebec (SPGQ), a large
Quebec public service union, has noted that within
Quebec there are “personal and political links between politicians, senior officials and contractors that raise serious questions of conflict of interest.”[15] Thus, governments within in
Canada, particularly the federal government, can distribute government contracts as patronage rather than have the work done “in-house” by neutral public servants.The impact of implementing NPM to make government more efficient has been to reduce the size of the public service. This reduction in the size of the public service has diminished its capacity to develop and manage policy. Therefore, in order to maintain the same quality in policy development and management, the government has had to seek private assistance. The use of management consultants by the federal government presents another opportunity for patronage. Since management-consulting firms are profit maximizing, they will not necessarily be as impartial as a public servant. Therefore, some management-consulting firms have hired individuals with connections to the government or provided biased advice to government departments that supports the government position in the hopes of getting return business.[16] Thus, government is able to give patronage to political allies or in return for favourable, credible support through consulting contracts. Therefore, the evolution of patronage in Canadian public administration through changing models of government illustrates how patronage persists in spite of political change. Thus, although public service jobs are largely based on merit, government appointments and contracts ensure that patronage opportunities within Canadian public administration remain.In addition to the government of
Canada not being a perfect model of government and to patronage adapting to changing political dynamics, patronage also remains within Canadian public administration because it is persistent and has become an accepted part of the Canadian political tradition. For example, the Canadian political tradition has accepted that the Cabinet and the Prime Minister have significant appointment powers. That is, although the PM and Cabinet have clear political motivations, Parliament and the Canadian populace as a whole have accepted their ability to make these appointments. These appointments include positions within public administration and, more specifically, senior public servants such as deputy ministers and assistant deputy ministers.[17] Therefore, there must be some acceptance by both Parliament and the Canadian populace for some patronage within Canadian public administration or Parliament and Canadian people would demand a redistribution of these appointment powers. Parliament is hesitant to resist these appointment powers because of the long-standing Canadian political tradition for MPs of the governing party to receive appointments when they retire or are defeated in an election. For example, Stan Keyes, a Liberal MP for Hamilton Centre, was appointed Consul-General in
Boston when defeated in the 2004 General Election. These appointment powers also help ensure the strict party discipline evident in Parliament. A study of the 35th Canadian Parliament (1993-1997) found that MPs’ behaviour could not be explained solely by ideological preferences and that the behaviour is influenced by electoral, parliamentary and party rules, which include rules regarding the provision of patronage appointments.[18] Therefore, long-standing Canadian political traditions regarding the provision of patronage to MPs create acceptance for patronage in Canadian public administration within Parliament.Similarly, Canadian political parties are also hesitant to resist patronage within Canadian public administration. As with Members of Parliament, loyal members of political parties often are provided with patronage appointments, particularly if they have shown support to the leader of the party. For example, Joe Clark appointed a number of Conservative organizers in
Quebec to posts on the Quebec Superior Court in
Montreal.[19] The prospects of receiving patronage appointments or other benefits are even motivators for some people to join political parties in
Canada. A study analysing the membership of Canadian political parties in 2000 found that a percentage of people join political parties (particularly the Liberal and Progressive Conservative parties) to receive selective incentives. Selective incentives are defined in the study as including material incentives such as patronage appointments and government contracts.[20] Therefore, the provision of patronage to loyal members of the party and that such patronage can encourage membership within a political party create acceptance for patronage in Canadian public administration within Canadian political parties.The acceptance of patronage by Parliament and Canadian political parties has ensured that patronage remains a political tradition within the Canadian government. The possibility of future patronage benefits to MPs and party members ensures that there will not be any substantial opposition within the political establishment to patronage. Therefore, patronage persists in Canadian public administration in spite of widespread support amongst the Canadian populace for the use of merit within public administration.In conclusion, patronage retains a significant place within the Canadian government and Canadian public administration despite the move to merit principles introduced initially by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1918. Thus, although the Public Service Commission makes decisions on the majority of jobs within the federal government on merit, substantial patronage opportunities remain available. These patronage opportunities remain available for three broad reasons: the political system in
Canada is not perfect as in a theoretical model, the types of patronage and methods of distributing patronage have evolved over time, and there is a measure of acceptance by Canadian political parties and Parliament for the existence of patronage appointments within public administration. Thus, the idea that Canadian government is not representative of a theoretical model enables patronage to remain because political actors do not behave as they theoretically supposed to act. Therefore, the Prime Minister can appoint individuals to Foreign Service positions, positions within Crown corporations and other governmental agencies and, more concerning, senior public servant positions based on qualities other than the abilities and qualifications associated with merit. Similarly, the idea that patronage has evolved throughout Canadian political history ensures patronage will continue because new patronage opportunities arise when other opportunities are lost. For example, the move to merit principles for the hiring of most public servants eliminated many patronage opportunities. However, the subsequent rise of the social welfare state and, more recently, New Public Management beliefs have created new patronage opportunities through employment in many Crown corporations and other governmental agencies, the expanded role of government contracts and through the use of management consultants by government.Lastly, the broad acceptance by Parliament and Canadian political parties for patronage allows patronage to survive because there is no significant political force willing to challenge patronage. The potential benefits for parliamentarians and political parties in return for allowing patronage ensures that most major political actors would be unwilling to challenge the idea of patronage. Therefore, patronage persists within Canadian public administration because the government is not theoretically perfect, patronage evolves and adapts over time, and because major political actors are broadly accepting of its existence.
[1] McCudden, Christopher. “Merit Principles”
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies Vol. 18 #4 559-562
[2] Gibbons, Kenneth. “The Study of Political Corruption” Political Corruption in
Canada Eds. Kenneth Gibbons and Donald Rowat, 1976, 9
[5] Morton, Desmond. “Reflecting on Gomery: Political Scandals and the Canadian Memory” Policy Options June 2005, 20-21
[7] Ziegel, Jacob S. “Merit Selection and Democratization of Appointments to the Supreme Court of
Canada” Judicial Power and Canadian Democracy Eds. Paul Howe and Peter H. Russell, 1999, 136
[11] Dobuzinskis, Laurent. “Historical and epistemological trends in public administration” Journal of Management History Vol. 3 #4, 304-305
[13] Vining, Aidan R., Anthony E. Boardman and Finn Poschmann. “Public-Private Partnerships in the
US and
Canada” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, Vol. 7 #3, 209
[15] Gow, James Iain. “Managing All Those Contracts: Beyond Current Capacity?” Public Management and Public Administration in
Canada Eds. Mohammed Charih and Arthur Daniels, 1997, 251-252
[16] Saint-Martin, Denis “Building the New Managerialist
State: Consultants and the Politics of Public Sector Reform in Comparative Perspective”, 208
[17] Bakvis, Herman “Prime Minister and Cabinet within
Canada: An autocracy in need of reform?” Journal of Canadian Studies Vol. 35 #4, 74
[18] Kam, Christopher. “Do Ideological Preferences Explain Parliamentary Behaviour?” Journal of Legislative Studies Vol. 7 #4, 89, 92, 99-101
[20] Young, Lisa and William Cross. “Incentives to Membership in Canadian Political Parties” Political Research Quarterly Vol. 55 #3, 557-559, 564
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